潮州美团电商运营培训多少钱
美团电商培训课程
始创于2009年的学员就业保障服务系统，可系统化输出企业急需的合格人才，实现从学业、到职业、到事业的一路陪伴。2021年，信航电商学院新增用人合作企业1953家。截止2021年底，信航电商学院与全国超过20万家知名企业建立了雇主合作关系。The Student Employment Security Service System, founded in 2009, can systematically output qualified talents urgently needed by enterprises, achieving companionship from academic studies, to careers, and to careers. In 2021, Xinhang E-commerce School added 1953 new employment cooperative enterprises. As of the end of 2021, Xinhang E-commerce School has established employer cooperation relationships with over 200000 well-known enterprises nationwide.
这几年，许多电商平台开始加入销售生鲜水果大军，越来越多的消费者选择从电商渠道购买水果。但最近有媒体报道，一位业内人士接受采访时称，果园出品的有伤的残次果，很难在传统渠道销售，一般以低价转卖给电商平台的商户，被业内叫“电商果”。在相关报道的留言区，也有网友吐槽此前在电商平台买水果的经历，甚至有人把报道中的“电商果”与劣质水果简单地划上了等号。Not only is the market scale huge, but the profits of fast fashion clothing are also much higher than other consumer goods. The gross profit margin of ZARA's parent companies Inditex and H&M is consistently above 50%. The gross profit margin of Volkswagen's fast moving consumer goods is generally around 20%. This means that the profits obtained by the e-commerce platform Fali Fast Fashion are much higher than those of other Fali products.
从分工理论上而言，电商代运营企业的出现是一种必然，且未来随着电商平台的进化，专业化的服务商依旧大有可为。但另一种悖论在于，作为平台与品牌背后的“打工人”，代运营企业注定难以掌握话语权。与平台、品牌这种脆弱的关系导致了行业的分散性，赢家往往不会一直赢。From the perspective of division of labor theory, the emergence of e-commerce proxy operators is inevitable, and with the evolution of e-commerce platforms in the future, there is still great potential for specialized service providers. However, another paradox lies in the fact that as the "workers" behind platforms and brands, it is destined to be difficult for proxy operators to have a say. The fragile relationship with platforms and brands leads to industry dispersion, and winners often do not always win.
代运营企业一般分为两大基本模式。一是买断式经销，二是非买断式代理。前者通过向品牌方垫资采购产品，赚取进销差价牟利，这是一种高投入、高风险的重资产模式。后者则是只提供服务，不碰货，利润来自服务费与佣金，是典型的轻资产。Agency operated enterprises are generally divided into two basic models. One is buyout distribution, and the other is non buyout agency. The former earns profits by advancing funds from the brand to purchase products, earning a price difference between purchase and sale, which is a high investment and high-risk heavy asset model. The latter only provides services, does not touch goods, and profits come from service fees and commissions, making it a typical light asset.
区别于淘系生态，TP们难以快速攻占抖快等新兴渠道的原因主要有两点：一是基因不同。淘系电商起源于货架，抖快则起源于内容，TP沉淀下的货架经验很难直接复制到抖音生态，这对TP的内容流量营销能力提出了更高的要求。二是竞争格局不同。抖快服务商中很多是从MCN或达人转型，这种模式依赖主播与运营人员的经验，因此格局较为分散，中腰部服务商占大头。There are two main reasons why TP companies find it difficult to quickly capture emerging channels such as Doukuai, which are different from Taoyuan ecosystem. Firstly, they have different genes. Taoshi e-commerce originated from the shelf, while Tiaokuai originated from the content. The shelf experience precipitated by TP is difficult to directly replicate to Tiktok ecology, which puts forward higher requirements for TP's content flow marketing capability. The second is that the competitive landscape is different. Many Doukuai service providers are transitioning from MCN or influencers, which rely on the experience of broadcasters and operators, resulting in a more dispersed pattern, with middle to lower back service providers accounting for the majority.
